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Greater Flexibility, Greater Growth: A Comparative Study of Labor and Capitalist
Models in Japan, Germany and the United States.

Jay A. Thompson
ABSTRACT
After the end of the Second World War, three major economic powers emerged.
Japan in Asia, Germany in Europe, and the United States in North America, quickly
became the economic engines of their respective regions. Japan, with its “catch-up” and
producer centered economy, grew so fast and so large, that there were worries in America
that the Japanese would end up winning the economic war. West Germany, supported by
the capitalist world, became a miracle economy, and the economic power of the
European Union.
In the past fifteen years however, these two economies have faltered and
stagnated. In Japan, the nineteen nineties are referred to as the “lost decade”. In
Germany, unemployment continued to grow throughout the decade, and in the former
East Germany remained at near catastrophic levels. Much has been written about the
reasons for this, referring to the quick and somewhat chaotic reunification of Germany,
and the focus of the Japanese on “catching up” to the West. Yet these are not adequate
explanations. The problems lie deep in the systemic level of both economies, particularly
in the area of labor policies, both in formal written laws and policies prevalent in
iv

Germany, and the informal cultural guarantees that are seen in the Japanese systems. The
area of the non-liberal capitalist model, particularly the banks and capital investment also
contributes to the continued economic stagnation of these two states. Comparing these to
the liberal economic policies in the United States, this thesis will show that greater
flexibility in both the capitalist and labor models allow for greater success in the
globalized economy.

v

Chapter 1
Introduction

After the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the new global
economy, three economies began to grow and then ultimately dominate the world
economic system. The United States, Germany, and Japan were considered to be the
economic engines of this system, with production levels to back up such claims.
Japan and Germany were devastated at the end of the Second World War,
economically, politically and militarily. Yet the way they bounced back and dominated
their spheres, they took on the title of “economic miracles,” models of marvel for the
world to emulate. Indeed the Japanese model became the base of the East Asian model
and the German model became the economic engine for the European Union.
Beginning in the nineteen nineties, however, both Japan and Germany began to
face serious economic challenges. Both systems encountered stagnant growth, high
unemployment, large and bloated industries not adaptable to the fast-paced global
economy, and labor practices that made change difficult.
What happened to the two economic miracles since the nineteen nineties? Indeed,
this has been a matter of much discussion and analysis recently. Scholars in general and
German scholars in particular often lay the blame on the reunification of Germany.
While the quick reunification that was completed under the leadership of Helmut Kohl
1

was a shock to the West German economy, it does not adequately explain the continued
stagnation of the German economy.
The economic system of the United States, however, has continued to flourish and
grow. While there have been downturns, such as the deep recession in the early nineteen
nineties, the United States economy recovered and grew at a high rate, including the
longest period of expansion since the end of the Second World War, during the same time
that Japan and Germany were struggling with sustained economic decline in the 1990s.
Both Japan and Germany‟s economic systems were designed to be “catch-up”
economies. This required an emphasis on labor and on mass production, at the expense
of innovation and creative education. Solid ties were required between the government
and labor, giving much power to the unions. Such guarantees as lifetime employment,
paid sick leave, paid vacation time, assured employment, generous pensions and
unspoken assurances against unemployment were, in the eyes of the governments,
necessary to build their economies.
In addition to the emphasis on labor and on mass production, the capitalist system
itself developed in a similar fashion in the two states. “Catching up” required a nonliberal style of capitalism, something that seems on the surface to be a contradiction.
Featuring heavy investment from banks which, especially in Japan, are influenced or
directly controlled by the federal government, these “non-liberal” capitalist models were
for over forty years an attractive alternative for developing economies that were not
entirely convinced by the laissez-faire economic model of the United States but did not
wish to adopt a command and control economic system similar to the Soviet Union. For
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a time it seemed as though these “catch-up” economies were in fact going to surpass the
United States. Then they caught up.
Research Problem
The research problem addressed in this paper is the non-liberal economic model
and its limitations as an alternative to the United States laissez faire economic model.
This subject is important as the world watches the rise of non-liberal capitalist economies
such as China and Singapore and developing countries look to a system that will allow
them to develop and succeed yet not necessarily bow to the liberal democratic altar of the
United States and the United Kingdom. Azar Gat speaks of this at length in his article
from the July/August 2007 Foreign Affairs entitled “The Return of Authoritarian Great
Powers.” Gat sees the rise of economically successful non-democratic states as the
formation of a new second world, and that this new second world would be regarded as
an “attractive alternative to liberal democracy.”1 Considering the failure of the United
States‟ attempt to forcefully install a liberal democracy in Iraq, this is definitely within
the realm of possibility.
The non-liberal subjects of this study, Japan and Germany, cannot be considered
authoritarian powers by any means. Both feature well-developed democratic institutionsthough not based on the United States democratic model as both are closer to a
parliamentary system. However, their economic systems are somewhat closer to an
authoritarian model, funded by large banks that are often in the control or influence of the
federal government, and inexorably tied in with a highly educated and well trained labor
force.
1

Gat 2007 p. 67
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In fact, looking at Japan and Germany‟s economic models there are perhaps two
defining features that separate it from a U.S.-type model: the symbiotic ties to labor, and
a capitalist system that is based on credit and bank investment.
Thesis and Methodology
It is the hypothesis of this work that the capitalist system and inflexible labor
policies that are prevalent in Japan and Germany are major underlying factors to the
economic stagnation of their systems. These policies, important and necessary in a catchup economic system, include strong ties between the government and labor, a high level
of governmental control of the direction of the economy, formal, codified guarantees to
labor, such as the right of arbitration, paid sick leave, extended paid vacation, a high level
of authority given to the unions, and informal guarantees that are part of the society and
culture. Using the United States as the preeminent example of a liberal laissez-faire
economy, comparisons will be made using a variety of economic performance measures
from 1970 to 2000, including GDP, growth in GDP, unemployment, change in
unemployment, inflation levels, among other factors. This thirty-year period gives ample
time to show economic upswings, downturns, and recoveries, as well as the explosive
growth exhibited by Japan and Germany before the nineties.
The methodology will be comparative and qualitative in nature. The economic
performance of the three states for the time period of 1970 to 2000 will be examined.
There will then be an examination of the genesis of the German and Japanese systems,
followed by separate chapters examining each of the three systems in regards to their
labor policies and capitalist models. There is then an overall analysis, as well as a final
chapter listing conclusions. This project should show that the inflexibility inherent in the
4

non-liberal systems is a catalyst for stagnation and that greater flexibility leads to greater
growth.
Conceptualization
In this paper, the following terms are utilized:
Neo-Liberal- This is the economic model that is globally based, with little or no trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas. It shares many features with the liberal capitalist
model.
Liberal Capitalism- this is the economic model used in the United States. A laissez-faire
system, liberalism is a flexible system with little or no control from the government,
consumer driven, and is funded primarily by capital investment.
Non-Liberal Capitalism- the economic model found in Germany and Japan. The nonliberal economic model is a top-down economic model, funded primarily by banks and is
a producer driven model. The system differs from a command and control system in that
it is still a capitalist system with both personal and corporate private ownership.
Globalization- Globalization is defined in this paper as the global export of the neoliberal economic model.
Literature Review
The topics of the failure of the Japanese and German systems over the last fifteen
years has been a subject that has been discussed widely and frequently, with many
explanations, predictions, and “fixes” postulated and discussed. With solutions ranging
from maintaining the status quo to outright economic revolution, the research studied
runs the gamut across all ideologies and theoretical frameworks.

5

Certainly the role of labor in both the success and failings of these economic
systems has been examined. The role of labor in the era of globalization is a matter of
much debate. Germany and Japan have two of the most symbiotic relationships between
government and labor in the world. It was labor that was a primary cause for the
economic resurgence of Germany and Japan, and the governments that developed
policies that were beneficial for labor. It can be expected then that the labor would fight
what they would see as threats to the guarantees they have come to expect.
What would be the impact of the lowering of labor standards? This is a specter of
globalization: that in an effort to remain competitive, states would end up engaging in a
“race to the bottom,” described by Alan Tonelson in The Race to the Bottom: Why a
Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled Free Trade are Sinking American Living
Standards as “…countries with the weakest workplace safety laws, the lowest taxes, and
the toughest unionization laws win investment from American and European
countries…”2 While it is unlikely that we will see labor standards in Germany and Japan
fall to third world standards, the idea of losing their generous benefits worries labor
organizations in those states. This view however, may not be necessarily true.
In their 2004 article for The Cambridge Journal of Economics Vicente Navarro,
John Schmidt, and Javier Astudillo make a case that under the current system of
globalization the state welfare systems that exist in such countries such as Denmark and
Sweden the social safety nets are not only maintaining their current levels, but actually

2

Tonelson, 2000. The Race to the Bottom
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increasing.3 This is contrary to the current wisdom that in order to remain competitive,
the “cradle to grave” system seen in Scandinavia must be cut.
The race to the bottom is not necessarily inevitable. Several works, in addition to
the article mentioned above, take a more optimistic view of the current trends in labor
issues in this age of globalization. Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization
takes a qualitative look into the state of labor and the roles of international organizations
in enforcing global labor standards, especially the International Labor Organization or
ILO. The central argument in this book is that these organizations are necessary and that
it makes economic sense to enforce global standards, such as freedom from forced labor,
nondiscrimination, abolition of forced labor, and freedom to unionize.4 In other words,
the book makes a case that not only can standards improve, but these improvements will
in fact benefit a state‟s economy. This case is further backed up by a study by Thomas
Palley published in the January Cambridge Journal of Economics titled “The Economic
Case for Labor Standards” that shows the economic benefits of instituting the core labor
standards that are listed in the Elliott book. In this study he shows that such standards
could promote economic stability, using the case study of South Korea and Indonesia in
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. South Korea thrived while
Indonesia experienced a “total economic breakdown.”5
If then the research shows that higher labor standards are beneficial to a state‟s
economy, how may it be hypothesized, as it is in this thesis, that high labor standards are
crippling the Japanese and German economies? It may lie in the inflexibility of the
3

Navarro. 2004
Elliott & Freeman 2003 p.8
5
Palley. 2004 p. 31
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system. United States labor also enjoys very high standards and the economy remains
flexible and able to adapt. Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura edited two volumes
for the Cornell Studies in Political Economy series, both an invaluable resource for this
project. These two volumes, The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese
Capitalism and The Origins of Non-Liberal Capitalism: Japan and Germany in
Comparison provide an excellent background for the study.
The Origins of Non-Liberal Capitalism is a look into the systems of Germany and
Japan, both of which are capitalist, yet “place relatively little trust in laissez faire”.6 In
Japan and Germany, according to these editors, there exists government controlled
capitalism, managed by “various forms of hierarchical and organizational coordination
that sometimes require heavy interjections of public authority with vertical control or
horizontal collective bargaining often overriding contractual exchanges as entered into by
private agents on their own volition, discretion and calculation.”7 In other words:
governmental control over nearly all aspects of a free market economy. Seemingly
contradictory, the system was remarkably successful for many decades. The selections in
the book examine such topics as the beginnings of the system in Germany, how the
German model impacted Japan- going back even further than the end of the second world
war- and the trading regimes the two states were a part of.
The other volume, The End of Diversity?: Prospects for German and Japanese
Capitalism is also an edited volume, examining the two economies in a more
contemporary setting. One selection, written by Peter Katzenstein, looks at Japan and

6
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Streek. 2001 p.6
Ibid.
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Germany‟s roles in their respective trading areas, Europe and East Asia. It looks at the
different systems of integration, from the formality of the EU to the informal networks of
East Asia.8 Looking at these two methods of integration is interesting especially, as with
regards to labor standards: formality in the west and informality in the East. In other
words, German guarantees to its workers are formal, codified, and written. In Japan, they
are understood more so than written, part of a cultural system in place for hundreds of
years. Not only does this make it notoriously difficult to research, but makes the solution
even more difficult, as it requires deep systemic changes that will not only be difficult for
the people to accept, but may also cause short-term damage, making the benefits of such
reform difficult to see and in democratic systems, where the government is ultimately
responsible to the people, difficult to maintain.
The edited volume The Future of the German Economy: An End to the Miracle?
looks at this in some detail. It was the continuing economic stagnation that caused the
Christian Democrats under the control of Helmut Kohl to lose control of the Bundestag
for the first time in decades in 1998. Despite electoral hardships, Chancellor Gerhardt
Schroeder‟s red-green coalition maintained control in the 2002 election9, allowing them
to continue their reforms.
The book takes a slightly different path than most works regarding the future of
the German economic model. It is optimistic; bringing up positive indicators such as low

8

Katzenstein. 2003
This was likely caused by Schroeder‟s solid opposition to the Iraq war, a stand very
popular with the German public
9
9

inflation and large exports- it is the third largest exporter in the world.10 Despite its
optimistic tone, however, the editors admit to serious flaws in the model.
Many of these flaws also exist in the Japanese model. It is interesting how similar
these two economies are in their makeup, their strengths, their weaknesses, even their
history. Sheldon Garon looks at the history of Japanese labor and its impact with the
state in his book The State and Labor in Modern Japan. This book is an overview of the
labor movements in Japan in the period from 1868-1945. Primarily historical in nature,
the work shows that many of the features of the Japanese economy and labor existed long
before the end of the Second World War. “As early as 1902, a former prime minister,
Okuma Shigenobu, declared his nation‟s modern social policies to be firmly grounded in
the Confucian ruling ideology of Japan‟s pre-industrial past …‟from ancient times, our
statesman have espoused ideas of state socialism‟”.11 This supports the hypothesis that
the flaws in the system are deep and systemic, and change will be difficult.
Looking at some of these difficulties, Ikuo Kume writes Disparaged SuccessLabor Politics in Postwar Japan, again from the Cornell Studies in Political Economy.
This work takes a look at the Japanese state and labor after the Second World War,
directing attention to the role of unions and their strength in shaping the post-WWII
economic system. Kume feels that labor in Japan has not gotten its fair due of credit in
the success Japan experienced. He states: “Most scholars, however, have characterized
Japanese labor as docile and powerless, and have neglected its achievements”12 This is
an assessment that is merited. Labor in Japan and Germany has been possibly the most
10

Harding & Paterson 2000. p. 127
Garon. 1987 p. 11
12
Kume. 1998. p. 3
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instrumental factor in the amazing success that the two states experienced, coming out of
devastation. As will be shown in later chapters, though labor does not extend its
influence in Japan in the same manner as in the west, it is a force that is not taken lightly
by the Japanese government. In Germany, labor and the unions are a central part of the
economic system, and are often pandered to by the government.
What is seen in the research examined above is excellent background for the
purpose of this study. There has also been several works produced for a more popular
audience, including Thomas Friedman‟s The Lexus and the Olive Tree.13 These works
give a good overview of the non-liberal capitalist models for a more general audience. It
is important and interesting that the idea of different capitalist models is gaining more
and more attention, especially as authoritarian powers such as China become more
powerful and influential in the global economy. However, the weaknesses and failures of
the non-liberal economic models, particularly in the area of labor and labor policy, make
a convincing argument that these non-liberal models are not conducive to long-term
sustained economic growth.

13

Friedman, 1999.
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Chapter 2
Economic Performance

The economic performances of Japan and Germany have faced downturns in the
past decade and a half. Can this be explained as merely a normal though long-lasting
downturn? To answer that, economic performance will be examined for thirty years,
1970 to 2000, for Germany, Japan, and the United States. This period may show any
economic downturns and recoveries within the three states central to this study. The
factors examined will be the following: Gross Domestic Product and changes in GDP,
unemployment rates and changes in unemployment, and the changes in inflation rates.
These three factors will give an overview of the performance of the respective economies
over a significant period of time.
GDP
The gold standard of economic indicators, GDP is perhaps the most often used
indicator for economic performance, as well as that rates annual change. We will first
look at the performance of the United States. The following data comes from the
Econwatch website.14

14

EconStats
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Table 1- US GDP, 1970-2000

Year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

GDP - real (2000$)

Change from
Previous Year in $

9817
346.7
9470.3
403.4
9066.9
363.4
8703.5
374.6
8328.9
297.2
8031.7
196.2
7835.5
302.8
7532.7
196.1
7336.6
236.1
7100.5
-12
7112.5
131.1
6981.4
238.7
6742.7
267.6
6475.1
211.5
6263.6
209.9
6053.7
240.1
5813.6
389.8
5423.8
234.5
5189.3
-102.4
5291.7
130
5161.7
-11.7
5173.4
158.4
5015
264.5
4750.5
209.6
4540.9
229.7
4311.2
-8.4
4319.6
-21.9
4341.5
236.5
4105
206.4
3898.6
126.7
3771.9
3771.9 X
Units : Billions of 1996 dollars.

Change from
Previous Year
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.00
-0.01
0.05
0.05
0.03

In Table 1 there are only two years of negative GDP growth, 1974 and 1982, both
years of deep recessions. By this figure, it is seen that even during downturns, the US
economy was active and growing at a sustainable rate.
13

Table 2 looks at the German GDP data.
Table 2- German GDP, 1970-2000

Year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971

Gross domestic
product in $

GDP Change from
Previous Year in $

1877.513
2112.492
2149.419
2113.453
2387.659
2463.220
2098.934
1959.036
2023.022
1778.721
1505.481
1182.867
1194.529
1108.596
891.238
624.702
617.951
654.802
655.119
681.435
811.464
758.772
640.175
514.698
445.958
418.870
380.983
346.489
257.957
213.789

-234.979
-36.927
35.966
-274.206
-75.561
364.286
139.898
-63.986
244.301
273.24
322.614
-11.662
85.933
217.358
266.536
6.751
-36.851
-0.317
-26.316
-130.029
52.692
118.597
125.477
68.74
27.088
37.887
34.494
88.532
44.168
29.491

GDP Change from
Previous Year
-0.13
-0.02
0.02
-0.13
-0.03
0.15
0.07
-0.03
0.12
0.15
0.21
-0.01
0.07
0.20
0.30
0.01
-0.06
0.00
-0.04
-0.19
0.06
0.16
0.20
0.13
0.06
0.09
0.09
0.26
0.17
0.14

Units in Billions of U.S. Dollars

Table 2 tells a different story compared to the United States. The German GDP
rate was in a word phenomenal during the 1970s. For example, in 1973 Germany had a
14

growth rate of 26 percent. Such growth, however, was not sustainable. From 1990 to
2000, Germany had five years of negative growth, some of it quite significant (2000 and
1997). Later growth rates have not been encouraging.
Table 3 looks at Japan.

15

Table 3- Japan GDP, 1970-2000
Year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

GDP$

Change in Dollars
4763.239
4500.394
3941.153
4310.662
4699.475
5284.720
4804.902
4368.384
3800.562
3483.681
3049.077
2960.049
2978.354
2457.662
2022.719
1364.157
1283.095
1203.094
1101.066
1184.170
1070.461
1011.071
970.856
691.476
561.520
500.377
458.912
414.676
304.865
230.026
203.721

262.845
559.241
-369.509
-388.813
-585.245
479.818
436.518
567.822
316.881
434.604
89.028
-18.305
520.692
434.943
658.562
81.062
80.001
102.028
-83.104
113.709
59.39
40.215
279.38
129.956
61.143
41.465
44.236
109.811
74.839
26.305
203.721

Change from Previous
Year
0.06
0.12
-0.09
-0.09
-0.12
0.09
0.09
0.13
0.08
0.12
0.03
-0.01
0.17
0.18
0.33
0.06
0.06
0.08
-0.08
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.29
0.19
0.11
0.08
0.10
0.26
0.25
0.11

Units in Billions of U.S. Dollars

Like Germany, Japan experienced remarkable growth in the 1970s and even into
the nineteen eighties. However, in the 1990s the poisoned fruits of the “lost decade”
begin to be seen. Like Germany, Japan experienced five years of negative growth, and
16

later growth rates have not been strong. Again we see unsustainable growth as compared
to the United States.
Inflation
The term that brings a collective shudder to both Germans and Americans,
inflation which is based on consumer price index or CPI, is the increase or decrease in the
cost of living. Low inflation is an indicator of stability, high inflation the reverse. It was
the high inflation levels of the nineteen thirties that paved the way for the fascist
government to take hold of power in Germany and the “stagflation” of the nineteen
seventies that helped to elect Reagan in the United States. The specter of inflation has
been somewhat muted in the last few years in the United States, however, as the
following table shows. The following figures come from EconStats.15

15

Ibid.
17

Table 4- United States Growth in Inflation Rates, 1970-2000
Inflation Rates
Year Change from Previous Year
2000
1.19
1999
0.64
1998
-0.79
1997
-0.59
1996
0.12
1995
0.2
1994
-0.34
1993
-0.08
1992
-1.2
1991
-1.17
1990
0.57
1989
0.75
1988
0.42
1987
1.76
1986
-1.65
1985
-0.75
1984
1.09
1983
-2.92
1982
-4.2
1981
-3.22
1980
2.3
1979
3.62
1978
1.13
1977
0.76
1976
-3.74
1975
-1.91
1974
4.87
1973
2.97
1972
-1.02
1971
-1.55

As seen from the above chart, inflation rates for the decade of 1990-2000 have
been what most economists would consider insignificant. This is an important indicator
of the continuing strength of the US economy.

18

Table 5 looks at inflation rates for Germany.
Table 5- German Growth in Inflation Rates, 1970-2000

Year Percent Chg per Year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

2.10
0.70
0.60
1.50
1.20
1.70
2.70
4.50
5.00
3.70
2.70
2.70
1.30
0.30
-0.10
2.10
2.40
3.30
5.10
6.40
5.60
3.90
2.70
3.70
4.30
5.90
7.00
7.00
5.50
5.20
3.40

19

Germany‟s inflation rate, while not catastrophic, still is high when compared to
the United States. Between the years 1993 to 1995, Germany saw an inflation rate of
nearly ten percent. This is not an indicator of stable growth.
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Table 6 looks at Japan.
Table 6- Japanese Growth in Inflation Rates 1970-2000

Year

Percent Chg per Year

2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

-0.80
-0.30
0.60
1.70
0.00
-0.10
0.70
1.20
1.70
3.30
3.10
2.30
0.70
0.10
0.60
2.00
2.30
1.90
2.80
4.90
7.80
4.00
4.20
8.20
9.40
11.70
23.10
11.70
4.80
6.40
7.60
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Japan has not experienced such fluctuation in inflation rates as Germany. Indeed,
it can be said that Japan has had more success with containing inflation rates. It must be
remembered, however, that this may be attributed to Japan‟s low interest rates.
Unemployment
The final economic indicator examined, unemployment, is the most politically
charged as it is the indicator that most directly affects the voters that determine the
government in democracies. Many US presidents have discovered to their chagrin the
results of high unemployment, particularly during an election year. Bumps in the
unemployment rate can be expected as part of the business cycle, yet continuing and
long-lasting unemployment and growth in these indicators is indicative of larger
problems.
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Table 7- US Unemployment Rates, 1970 to 1999
Year

United States

1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

4.2%
4.5%
4.9%
5.4%
5.6%
6.1%
6.9%
7.5%
6.8%
5.6%
5.3%
5.5%
6.2%
7.0%
7.2%
7.5%
9.6%
9.7%
7.6%
7.1%
5.8%
6.1%
7.1%
7.7%
8.5%
5.6%
4.9%
5.6%
5.9%
4.9%
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Change from
previous year
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.2
-0.5
-0.8
-0.6
0.7
1.2
0.3
-0.2
-0.7
-0.8
-0.2
-0.3
-2.1
-0.1
2.1
0.5
1.3
-0.3
-1.0
-0.6
-0.8
2.9
0.7
-0.7
-0.3
1.0
X

In twenty of the thirty years analyzed, rates were negative, meaning that
unemployment dropped. The longest period of positive growth of unemployment was
three years. The unemployment rate of 4.2 percent in 1999 meant that for most purposes,
unemployment was nearly nonexistent.
Germany has not experienced similar results.
Table 8- German Unemployment Rates, 1970-1999
Year

Germany

1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

9.0%
9.4%
9.9%
8.9%
8.2%
8.5%
7.9%
6.7%
5.6%
5.0%
5.7%
6.3%
6.3%
6.6%
7.2%
7.1%
6.9%
5.6%
4.0%
2.8%
2.9%
3.3%
3.4%
3.4%
3.4%
1.6%
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
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Change from
previous year
-0.4
-0.5
1.0
0.7
-0.3
0.6
1.2
1.1
0.6
-0.7
-0.6
0
-0.3
-0.6
0.1
0.2
1.3
1.6
1.2
-0.1
-0.4
-0.1
0
0
2.8
0.9
0
0.1
0.1
X

Germany‟s unemployment has grown steadily since 1990, reaching a peak of
nearly ten percent in 1997. This rate is high for any economic system. Since 1990 the
unemployment rate has increased by over five percent. It is the unemployment rate that
was a major factor in the downfall of the Christian Democratic Party‟s coalition after
eighteen years.
Table 9 examines Japan.
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Table 9- Japanese Unemployment Rates 1970 to 1999
Year

Japan

1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

4.7%
4.1%
3.4%
3.4%
3.2%
2.9%
2.5%
2.2%
2.1%
2.1%
2.3%
2.5%
2.9%
2.8%
2.6%
2.8%
2.7%
2.4%
2.2%
2.0%
2.1%
2.3%
2.0%
2.0%
1.9%
1.4%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
1.2%

Change from
previous year
0.6
0.7
0
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.1
0
-0.2
-0.2
-0.4
0.1
0.2
-0.2
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2
-0.1
-0.2
0.3
0
0.1
0.5
0.1
-0.1
0.1
0.1
X

Japan‟s unemployment in the last decade has more than doubled, and in the
following years has continued to grow. Japan has experienced more than a decade of
unemployment that has remained constant or in most cases has increased. The nearly
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five percent unemployment is catastrophic for a state that never had an unemployment
rate over 2.9 percent in twenty-five years.
Conclusions
In the preceding sections it is shown that Japan and Germany are experiencing
stagnation that is continuing and unrelenting. By comparing them to the United States,
the standard of success, one can see that there are definitely severe and deep problems in
the economic systems used by the two states.
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Chapter 3
Genesis of the German and Japanese Economic Systems

Now that it has been shown that these states are experiencing slowdowns, the
question is why. There are many reasons. However, looking at why and how the
economic systems of Germany and Japan developed is a necessary starting point.
The major countries of the European Union and Asia maintain a strong control
over labor policies in their respective countries.16 Germany and Japan are no exception to
this standard. This is a hallmark of a non-liberal capitalist system. The Schroeder and
Koizumi governments attempted several reforms, but met with only limited success.
There are several reasons for this, which will be examined in more detail. These include
the influence of labor unions on political parties, particularly those parties that are
considered left-leaning, and the “political will” of the citizens of a state to accept changes
that may cause some problems in the short-term, such as higher unemployment and the
loss of certain guarantees considered almost sacred by the members of that state.
To understand the reason for the development of non-liberal capitalist and labor
models, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the modern era, the end of the
Second World War. According to estimates, the Germans lost a staggering 3.5 million

16

An excellent example of this is the 2006 French labor reform which was eventually
defeated by popular revolt.
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soldiers (not including the millions that were injured and incapacitated for the rest of their
lives). Japan‟s numbers are estimated at close to two million killed.17 Given the makeup
of martial forces in the mid part of the twentieth century, it can be stated that the major
portion of these casualties were young men, the core of any working force. Near the end
of the war, as the Axis was forced to use young boys, they lost a portion of its next
generation of workers. The end of the war found the two countries in shambles, their
governments killed, arrested, or in hiding, their infrastructures destroyed, their economies
in ruins, and a large part of their labor forces in graves or in pieces. Labor was at a
premium and a near blank slate had been created for a new economic system. Those who
had survived the terror of the most destructive conflict in humankind‟s history were now
in control of the direction that the state would take in its future economic course. Adding
to this “perfect storm” was the need for an entirely new government as the fascist systems
had collapsed under the boot of the Red Army or the mushroom cloud of Hiroshima.
This brings up an important point. The Soviet Union lost nearly three times as
many soldiers during the war18 yet did not see the kind of change that occurred in both
Japan and Germany. This is largely due to the fact that the totalitarian systems in the
defeated states had fallen (though the Japanese emperor had been allowed to stay on the
throne, with symbolic power only) while Stalin remained secure in the Kremlin (even
more so than before the war, as he was now seen as the savior of the Motherland). With
a near blank slate to work with in Germany and Japan, a new age might come to pass.

17
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City University of New York.
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This blank slate is not without historical precedent. Seen here is a similar
situation to the end of feudalism after the rampage of the bubonic or “black” plague. The
feudal systems that existed in Europe relied on one major factor: the abundance of labor.
Basic economics tells us that as supply for a product or service is high, the price is low.
The serfs were plentiful in number, so the owners of the land did not have to pay much
for their services. When the plague hit, no one was spared; but as the serfs made up the
lion‟s share of the population of medieval society, they made up the lion‟s share of losses
from the plague. Exact figures have never been tabulated, but it is estimated that over a
quarter of the population of Europe may have died from the pandemic. This mass loss of
labor in such a short time (1347-1348 in the first outbreak) caused labor to no longer be
abundant, but rather at a premium. Harvests had to be gathered. Human labor was
needed to gather the harvests. The serfs who survived were now able to sell their one
commodity, themselves, for a much higher price.
The pandemic did not just strike the serfs. No one was safe from its ravages and
the upper classes fell victim as well. What developed at that point was a “perfect storm”
of three factors:
1) The loss of a large portion of the workforce
2) The removal of the governing class
3) The elimination of the accepted status quo
Compare this to the aftermath of the Second World War in Japan and Germany. These
three factors that had existed after the rampage of the plague were now in place in the
two defeated states. Germany and Japan lost a sizeable portion of their primary
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workforce, giving those who survived the ability to sell their labor at a premium. 19 Not
enough, the workers also demanded the ability to chart their own course. To put it
another way, the unions were now in charge. This upheaval of the status quo was made
possible due to the removal by the victorious powers of Adolf Hitler and the military
government of Japan. Our third test case, the United States, a victorious party, did not
suffer these effects described above. Its economic model would develop much
differently.
This paper is not an account of the creation of the West German and Japanese
economic systems. But some points are brought up to illustrate the historical roots of a
political/economic system where labor and government are so intrinsically tied together
that separating them is impossible. Added to this, however, was the unique global
situation that immediately followed the end of the Second World War. The USSR,
another victorious party in the Second World War- admittedly a victory earned at an
incredibly high cost- had brought nearly every European state east of Germany- and part
of that state- under its sphere of influence and command-and-control style economic
system. A similar situation would likely have occurred in Japan and the Pacific had the
atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki not taken place.20 The United States, the
major occupying power of both West Germany and Japan, was now embroiled in yet
another global conflict- albeit not a shooting conflict- and determined to demonstrate the
19

Note that the workforce at the time was defined as young males. There is no question
of the impact of female workers, on both sides of the conflict, and nearly universally
accepted that this conflict began the large scale entrance of women into the workplace.
However, in the late 1940s, it was still held that the women would return home when the
men did.
20
It is felt by some scholars that this was the primary reason the United States used the
atomic bombs.
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benefits of a liberal economy. However, the situation was made complicated by the fact
that its two show states- West Germany and Japan- were rubble. The workforce was
devastated. The government was dead or in Allied prisons. And the physical
infrastructure- the status quo- was gone. All of these were casualties of the worst conflict
in humankind‟s history, and the result were two states that could not be less prepared to
build, support, and maintain an economic system that required innovation and a large
consumer base. Those two states would have to go a different direction than the one the
United States perhaps would have preferred to have laid out. They would first need to
“catch-up.” The modern capitalist systems of Japan and Germany cannot be described as
a copy of the United States model, despite the guidance of the United States in
developing those economic systems after the end of the Second World War.
This “catching-up” would require a new way, a new method of capitalism. As
described earlier, the situation that existed in Japan and Germany at the end of the Second
World War was unprecedented. As the new governments developed, so did the economic
systems. What resulted was a system that, while certainly not command and control,
relied on government control and guidance- most importantly in the form of capital and
credit from large banks that were often either part of the federal government or heavily
influenced by the federal government. Another important aspect that has developed in
this system has been an emphasis on the producer side of the economy. In other words,
Germany and Japan are producer-driven economies, as opposed to the United States‟
consumer-driven economy. This is perhaps the defining feature of the non-liberal
capitalist model. To put it another way, the two economies touted by the United States
during the Cold War as the success stories of capitalism were neither liberal nor
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consumer-driven; they were in fact a new capitalism that shared some features with
command-and-control economies.
The development of these economic systems has been extensively documented
and analyzed, and will not be covered in this paper.21 It is important, however, to
understand the beginnings of the systems, to understand why the capitalist and labor
models that developed were so important to the “catching-up” phases in Japan and
Germany. Indeed, it can be said that the systems in those two states developed the only
way they could if they were to attain the successes that were sought. With Japan and
Germany in a state of such devastation, a liberal economy was not an option, at least not
in the short term. And with the massive numbers of victorious U.S. troops still in the
streets of Tokyo and Germany, a move toward a Soviet Marxist-type economic system
was not a viable option either. The systems and models that emerged became a third
way, a way that seemed for many years to be a viable long-lasting alternative. The
features of these models, difficult to change and adapt once instituted, even if the models
had failed, became thoroughly entrenched as Japan and Germany became economic
miracles. After the downturn of the nineteen-nineties, the question of whether a nonliberal capitalist model- in particular the models of Japan and Germany- could sustain
economic development began to arise. The following chapters examine the results of the
development of those models, and what those models have done for sustained economic
development.
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I recommend Wolfgang Streek‟s The Origins of Non-Liberal Capitalism for the
development of Japanese and Germany‟s systems.
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Chapter 4
Negotiations at the System-Wide Level: The German Model

Germany is called the economic engine of the European Union, and not without
cause. The economic miracle that followed the Second World War and the resulting
partition of the state was incredible by any standards, and this miracle was powered by an
economic model that was unique in the West. Relying on a well educated, well trained
and loyal labor force, coupled with major investment from central banks and state laws
sympathetic to workers, Germany recovered from its destruction in a remarkably short
period of time, only to face difficult challenges when its catch-up economy caught up.
Examining the features of Germany‟s economic model, this chapter will examine the
flaws found in a system that requires such strong ties between the state and labor, and the
difficulties encountered when large banks are the primary source of capital, coupled with
an indirectly controlled producer-driven economy.
The focus of the German capitalist system is a producer-driven economy,
meaning that it is companies, not consumers, that dictate the direction of the economy. In
a state such as Germany where the large producers, the banks, and the government share
such close relations, it is an indicator of an economy that has strong, though indirect,
direction from the central government. Given that a similar situation exists in Japan,
study of this phenomenon will take place in a later chapter.
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The central government also exerts some indirect control over economic direction
in the manner that the labor system evolved. Germany‟s labor system development after
the end of the Second World War was built around a nucleus of powerful, multi-industrywide collective bargaining organizations.22 These coordinated unions were supported at
the plant-level by work councils which, while not bargaining for wages, had authority
over “a range of shop-floor issues relating to personnel and employment policies”23 such
as hiring procedures.
In 2000 there were twelve multi-industrial unions which bargain for workers in
the most important sectors of the German economy, such as the Metal Workers union.
Though these twelve organizations bargain separately, they tend to follow the pattern set
by the Metal Workers Union.24
It goes without saying that this system affords the German worker with very
strong protections. Even more interesting is that these protections are enshrined into law,
including the Works Constitution Act.25
There is in Europe a certain penchant for written agreements and laws, often
enshrined in the constitution. This penchant certainly makes its presence known when
examining the capitalist model in Germany. Wolfgang Streek states that in Germany
“…the institutions that embed its economy and shapes its performance are politically
negotiated and typically legally constitutionalized…”26 To put it another way, the
German capitalist and labor models are formal systems, with guarantees and co22
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operations that are in writing and often even in law. This is a unique feature of the
German capitalist model, as seen later in the examination of Japan, and a feature that
causes unique difficulties, especially in the age of globalization.
Union strength and viability has been called into question in the research of the
last decade. Indeed, the push toward the popular view of globalization seems to almost
require the adoption of neo-liberal norms giving employers much more power than they
once held even in states and systems such as Germany. However, others point to the
victories of German unions in the late nineteen nineties as evidence that neo-liberalism is
not becoming the norm.27 This is, according to one researcher, due to the German
employers need for peaceful employee relations or run the risk in this age of hyper-global
competitiveness of having their market disappear.28 These agreements, however, can
actually be detrimental to the unions, due to this reliance of labor peace over wage
moderation. Thelen and Wijnbergen state that the employers are using the threat of the
collapse of employer associations rather than the traditional lockout. As more employers
drop out of these associations or ignore collective bargaining agreements, it is not the
unions that are losing their strength, but the employer associations. 29 In the German
system, however, both are necessary and complement each other. What ends up
developing is a negative feedback loop, to use Thelen‟s terminology.
The question remains as to whether or not such a system is indeed a major factor
in the end of the German miracle. As mentioned before, the Ossies are often the factor at
the end of the pointed figure. The idea is not without merit. At the time of unification,
27
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West German productivity was ten times that of East Germany, the jewel of communist
dominated Eastern Europe. However, time and statistics have not borne this out. If the
depressed communist economy is the major factor of Germany‟s continued difficulty,
then how does one explain the success of the Czech Republic and Poland since the fall of
the old regimes. Both countries, it could be convincingly argued, were even more
enshrined in the Soviet system and neither had the advantage of a benefactor such as
West Germany. Both, however, were objects of the so called “shock therapy” system
that led to disastrous consequences in post-communist Russia, yet the sudden
liberalization contributed to consistent economic growth for those two states.
Even more telling is the fact that it is the former East Germany that continues to
have the most difficulties. Unemployment in the former East Germany, as of 2000,
remained steady at 16.5 percent30 (compared to 9% overall for Germany). While at first
glance this may indicate that it was the quick unification at work, examine this more
closely. Poland and the Czech Republic have both been successful, yet neither had the
economic productivity of East Germany prior to the fall of communism. East Germany,
all things being equal, should have excelled at liberalization. It could be argued, then,
that is it in fact the West German system, superior in the catch-up so desperately needed
after the destruction of the Second World War, that caused the malaise of the East
German system, and as a direct result, put and end to the miracle. How this occurred will
be covered in subsequent chapters.
The flaws that made the integration of the East German economy so difficult are
also some of the defining features of the German economic model. In the German non30
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liberal capitalist economy, perhaps the institutions with the most influence on the German
system are the banks. As the primary source of capital, the banks in Germany also have a
large amount of control in several other areas. “Bankers hold nearly 10 percent of the
seats on the supervisory boards of the one hundred largest industrial corporations in
Germany.”31 In addition, the ratio of bank loans to corporate financial liabilities
remained constant in Germany at 60 to 70 percent, indicating an obvious reliance on
banks.32 In terms of publicly held shares, banks hold nearly 10 percent in Germany.33
Indicating further bank control of the German capitalist system is the German proxy
voting system, which according to Pauly and Reich often leaves banks with control of
50% of the voting shares of many German MNCs. In addition, “In the largest German
corporations…the lead bank also provides the board chairman.”34
This does bring up the question as to who controls the banks, or to put it another
way, are the banks under the control of the government. This is an important point as it is
a strong indicator of how much control (albeit somewhat indirect) the central government
has over the economic system, particularly in systems where the major source of capital
is bank loans. In the case of Germany, the Bundesbank is independent of the Ministry of
Finance, yet one wonders how much informal influence the government has over the
federal bank which has built its credibility on price stability.35 This goal is an interesting
one for a capitalist system; the central bank‟s primary interest is not keeping the market
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as open as possible, but keeping prices from going too high, sometimes in spite of the
market forces. It is quite a difference from a liberal capitalist system.
Another difference from the liberal capitalist system represented by the United
States is this idea of system-wide negotiation. The development of negotiation at the
system-wide level can be understood by going back to May 1945. The benefits of
collective bargaining are extensively documented: higher pay, generous leave and sick
time, worker‟s grievance procedures, etc. Taking a look at how badly (West) Germany
needed what was left of its workforce after the end of the conflict, it is not surprising that
concessions were given. However, one can also guess that these men, young and old,
understood their position, that their work was now a premium; again, looking at the
historical precedent of the black plague and the end of feudalism, and also taking into
account that it was not just the societal structure and human structure that was decimated,
it was also the actual physical structures of the state and nation. For some, their families
were dead or gone. For many others, their family was all that remained from what they
remembered before they left for the steppes of the Baltic. There was little, if anything,
keeping them in the country that had failed them so miserably the prior six years. The
state was in no position to bargain with those who remained, and they formed togetherone can guess military indoctrination from early childhood had much to do with this- to
get themselves and their comrades the best “deal”. This is a major reason for the systemwide model that is seen in Germany, as well as a European sensibility for legal
frameworks. Establishing a legal framework would take a national government, again
something destroyed by allied bombs and guns. This national government would be
forced to develop a system that guaranteed labor rights and benefits.
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Germany set the standard with guarantees to labor in Europe, up to and including
clauses in the federal constitution that guarantee the right for collective bargaining. 36 The
effects of collective bargaining will be detailed in a later chapter, but deserves some
examination in this context. Collective bargaining, especially at a quasi-governmental
level like what is seen in Germany, removes wage determination from a market-based
model. In other words, it is an artificial level of pay, which has several consequences,
both positive and negative. This is an important point for the German model as it is a
system-wide collective bargaining in the case of the largest industries, which leads to the
conclusion that the government, in an indirect yet strong way, determines the wages for
labor. Returning to the starting point of this system, the end of World War II, one can
make the reasonable assumption that these wages would be unnaturally high. This is
particularly true in the lower-wage earning brackets. Statistically speaking, lower wage
jobs tend to have greater elasticity in the amount of compensation. However, in states
such as Germany, these jobs have less elasticity, which may have effects that would not
be immediately apparent, which will be discussed in a later chapter.37 In addition,
especially considering the chaos that many of these men experienced, guarantees of
continued employment would be at the top of the list.
Horst Siebert of the University of Kiel discusses the idea of employment security
at some length. “Hiring a worker becomes a somewhat irreversible decision,” he states in
a 1997 article from The Journal of Economic Perspectives, speaking of the protections
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that European governments mandate for workers.38 He further states that in some cases,
hiring a worker can be a longer-term investment than even a capital investment such as
new machinery.39 Again, the effects of this will be discussed in a later chapter, but one
can begin to imagine the consequences of such policies, both positive and negative.
We also must take a look at the required workers councils and the mandated
worker representation on supervisory boards. The 1976 codetermination law requires
that half the members of the supervisory boards of major firms must be worker
representatives.40 In addition, the plant-level contains protections and representations for
workers in the form of work councils. From the very top of the economic control levels,
the very constitution of the republic, to the industry-wide collective bargaining, to
workers councils at the plant-level, we see a system that acquiesced to the demands of
labor. Indeed, the symbiotic relationship between labor and government was by and
large a major cause, if not the primary cause, of the “economic miracle” Germany
enjoyed for over forty years after the defeat and destruction of World War II. This
relationship was a model for economies attempting to “catch up.”41 Unfortunately, as
time and later statistics have suggested, a catch up economy runs into massive difficulties
once they have actually caught up. This will be further borne out in the examination of
Japan.
Another consequence of catching up and the movement toward a globalized neoliberal economy has been the drop in German FDI. “… (in) 1996, foreign companies
38
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repatriated all their German profits, pulling a net $2.6 billion out of Germany. That‟s the
first outflow in years.”42 Globalization, or the new global economy, relies not only on
foreign investment, but also the ease at which foreign investment occurs. Evidence
seems to indicate that the German non-liberal capitalist model has made it “less and less
attractive as a destination for capital investment.”43 It is another unique challenge of the
German model.
Conclusions
Examining and comparing the labor and capitalist systems in Germany yields
interesting results. One can see how the two systems are complementary and even
symbiotic.
A formal system does have some advantages. In a state governed by the rule of
law, these agreements are easy to track and easy to examine if any changes are to be
made. When changes are deemed to be necessary, however, it is this rule of law that may
make those changes difficult to institute, especially if the state is governed by a
democratically elected leadership. As will be examined in a later chapter, making
changes that are beneficial in the long run but cause short term pain- higher
unemployment, higher inflation- are detrimental to the goal of keeping power. More so
in rule-of-law states is that the companies, the government, the people are subject to the
rule of law. These agreements, these constitutional guarantees, must be adhered to or
negative consequences will result. What this results in, especially in regards to
constitutional guarantees, is a system that is not easily changed and a system that makes
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changes on an informal basis, i.e., the company level, very difficult if not impossible to
accomplish.
Take for instance, the formal ties between government and labor. Labor
guarantees are enshrined into the constitution. Major unions bargain for wages on the
system-wide level with the government. These ties between labor and government end
up with the net effect of making change very difficult, as workers are the large majority
of the electorate in a West European liberal democracy. Making things more difficult,
however, is the capitalist model that requires such influence from banks. Banks are
interested in long term credit; in other words, they are not as adaptable as a stock or
investor based capital system. In short, banks are patient. Investors are not. The effects
of this will be examined in more detail in later chapters.
With a non-liberal capitalist system such as in Germany, it is not surprising that
what has developed is a producer driven economy. Given the “catch-up” needed after the
Second World War, the non-liberal capitalist system, with the strong and formal labor
ties, was the strongest system to achieve the goals of both Germany and the United
States. However, in the examination of this chapter, deep flaws have been found that
could lead to a continued malaise that cannot be solved easily. The question remains as
to whether or not the non-liberal system of Germany can remain mostly intact and still
compete with the United States, integrate into the globalized economy, and counter the
challenges of developing economic powers such as China and India.
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Chapter 5
Informal Guarantees Carved into Stone: The Japanese Model

The economic engine of the Asian-Pacific, Japan‟s economic malaise since the
early nineteen-nineties has been caused by a combination of a changing world economy,
labor policy, and a non-liberal capitalist model that cannot adapt quickly to changing
factors. Like Germany, Japan‟s economic model is a new way, neither command/control
nor liberal, with strong influence by banks and producers. Also like Germany, Japan‟s
economic model features strong ties between government and labor. What makes the
Japanese model unique, however, is the informal nature of these ties. The informality of
the ties makes the Japanese model difficult to research and even more difficult to change.
Despite the difficulties of the “lost decade” as the 1990s are known in Japan, the
model has been successfully exported throughout the Asian-Pacific region. The
economies of East Asia are often referred to as the East Asian Tigers, ferocious,
powerful, and fast-moving. Building on the model created in Japan, East Asia has
become an economic powerhouse that is a marvel to the developing world, a model
exported from Japan. What remains to be seen is if these states face the same challenges
as Japan. Those challenges are examined in this chapter. Looking at labor and the nonliberal capitalist model in Japan, the causes of a slowdown that shattered the illusion of a
Japanese economy poised to conquer the world will be shown.
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I remember as a child my father, who at the time was taking economics classes as
part of his baccalaureate program, telling me about an editorial cartoon showing the
United States on the deck of a battleship signing economic surrender papers to the
Japanese delegates. Indeed, in those heady days of the late seventies to the end of the
nineteen eighties it did seem that perhaps the monster that we had helped create after the
mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would overtake and defeat us. After all,
who, by the mid nineteen eighties, did not have a VCR or television stamped with “Made
in Japan” or more distressing, drove a Honda or a Toyota instead of one of the good old
fashioned Big Three vehicles?
The Japanese “catch-up model” with guarantees “such as „lifetime‟ employment
guarantees, internal promotion ladders, and flexible job design became export items in
themselves.”44 The Japanese non-liberal capitalist model shares quite a bit in common
with the economic model of Germany, not surprising considering that the two states were
forced to rebuild their economies at the same time with the same goals in mind, overseen
by the same power. As explained earlier, Japan and Germany were in a unique position
after the end of the Second World War with infrastructures in shambles, a major portion
of the workforce killed or injured, and governments in prison. What makes Japan unique
is “commanding compliance as a matter of informal obligation…”45 In other words,
there are few laws that shape the economic system. One must be careful with this,
however. There are some laws or formal associations that do not exist in Germany. For
an example of this, one needs look no further than the Bank of Japan which, according to
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Robert Boyer “has long been subject to the influence of the Ministry of Finance and
seems…that growth, credit, and the stability of the financial system appear to be the
objectives of monetary policy.”46
This is an important distinction from Germany, for like Germany, Japan‟s major
source of capital and corporate governance comes from banks.47 What this means is that
in Japan, even more than in Germany, the government controls the direction of the
economy, albeit in an indirect way. The Japanese government‟s primary monetary policy
is to keep the system stable. The method of accomplishing this task is through the Bank
of Japan. The Japanese model was utilized to great effect by the East Asian tigers, each
attempting to out-japan Japan. However, just as with Germany, the Japanese catch-up
model began to run into problems when it finally caught up.
As opposed to the German model, the Japanese model that developed after the
end of the Second World War was much less centralized and much less formal. Rather
than industry-wide mega-unions that developed policy from the top down, the Japanese
guarantees to their labor developed from the firm level.
This is an interesting dichotomy, and speaks to the East Asian model of informal
agreements. Dajin Peng addressed this in his paper “Invisible Linkages”. Analyzing the
informal networks of Asian expatriates, Peng concluded that these networks contributed
in a major way to the continued development of the East Asian Tigers48. Such networks
were not necessarily common to all expatriate groups; Russian expatriates, for example,
send little “home” as opposed to their Chinese counterparts. This difference can
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reasonably be assumed to be part of the culture of those groups. This cultural
phenomenon of East Asia does carry into Japan, as the guarantees given to Japanese
workers are as much cultural as legal. Consider, for instance, the idea of “lifetime
employment.”
Somewhat misnamed, the lifetime employment system, however, is a powerful
guarantee to the Japanese workforce. The term “lifetime employment” is a shorthand
term referring to the strong protections that Japanese workers have against dismissal,
which come from two major sources: labor law and the labor movement.49 Looking at
labor law first, it is shown that outright dismissal for reasons other than malfeasance is
quite difficult, requiring firms to show that they have an excess number of employees,
that the firm has attempted to avoid redundancies, and that they have a proper procedure
in place for selecting those to be dismissed. Large firms have usually found their
dismissals to be invalidated by the courts due to these strict conditions.50
The labor movement, on the other hand, has produced some interesting results.
As stated before, the majority of labor protection in Japan is informal in the sense that it
is centered around the plant or firm-level rather than at a governmental-level. These
plant-level firms, covered in more detail later, will actually accept nearly stagnant wage
growth as opposed to the loss of jobs. In the nineteen nineties, the infamous “lost
decade” wage growth increased by only two percent over the course of the decade. 51
Compare this to an inflation increase of close to twelve percent over the same period. In
other words, real wages, or the purchasing power of the yen that was brought home,
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decreased by approximately ten percent. This is a significant trade off by the unions at
large for not letting workers go. It is the Asian-group dynamic that plays a major part
here, the informal, invisible linkages.
Even these guarantees are not enough to stop the decline in employment, in
particular the manufacturing sector. Industrial productivity in the since 1990 rose only
slightly, and over one million manufacturing jobs disappeared between 1992 and 1996.52
To be sure, manufacturing is the economic sector that has taken the hardest hit in nearly
all developed countries in the age of globalization, but it is interesting that in a state and
system with such strong protections to labor that the losses in both jobs and productivity
would be so severe. Overall in face, during 1992 to 1998, the growth in employment on
average for Japan was 0.3 percent. Compare this to a growth rate of 1.6 percent in the
United States during the same time period.53
The Japanese tradition and culture causes some unique challenges of its own in
the new globalized economy. Globalization is not necessarily seen in Japan as a benefit;
many in fact blame the globalization movement for the economic bubble that caused the
late nineties Asian financial crisis in Japan.54 Globalization also puts an emphasis on
economic efficiency, and according to Gao is the main priority of industrialized countries
in the new age.55 Efficiency has not been achieved in Japan, at least in terms of labor
costs, which are now twice as high as labor costs in the United States.56
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Some economists feel that this efficiency has been sacrificed for the benefit of
equal outcomes. Indeed, economist Nakatani Iwao has stated that “to protect
equality…Japan has enacted too many regulations that have seriously restrained
competition.”57
Looking at this system, one might be begin to question how the capitalist model
in Japan can actually be called capitalist. Chalmers Johnson answers this question by
stating that “the government imbeds incentives and disincentives within the market to
achieve its goals; market players, enjoying private ownership of property, respond as they
see fit in order to secure their personal advantage.”58 In other words, private property
owners including businesses, consumers and producers are under no legal obligation to
do as the government asks. To put that another way, the ties that bind are informal.
As stated when examining labor, this phenomenon can be partially explained by
the culture and traditions in Asia. This point has to be understood, as this is what
provides the reason why an informal system as in Japan does not break down. It is a
somewhat safe assertion that what you see in Japan could not happen in the United States
or in Europe (and indeed has not in the case of Russia). That culture does not exist. Also
like Germany, Japan has built its economy around producers rather than consumers.
Corporations are seen as national assets in Japan, and as such it is not surprising that they
are looked at by the government and by the society as resources to be used for the benefit
of the state, much like oil or natural gas. In a culture and society such as Japan where the
informal linkages are perhaps the strongest, business owners see themselves and their
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companies as part of the state, and as such feel an obligation to the state. This plays out
with the labor policy described above and a willingness for the central bank and the
bureaucracy to dictate economic policy. It is –much more so than in Germany- command
and control without being command and control. This fascinating aspect of the Japanese
economy is the foundation on which the entire economic model is built. It is also what
makes change in the system so difficult.
Taking a look at another defining feature of the Japanese labor model, the (again
misnamed) seniority wage system, this idea of informal guarantees plays out again. More
accurately described as a skill-based system (meaning that the increase in wages is
commensurate to the learned skills and training achieved by the worker over the course of
his/her employment), 59 this system, not enshrined by any law, guarantees workers higher
pay the longer they are with the firm (under certain conditions). This informal guarantee,
considered a bedrock of Japanese labor policy to the extent that Japanese workers are
willing to take a de-facto cut in pay to preserve it, ties in directly with lifetime
employment as powerful incentives to stay with the firm. This is a direct consequence of
needing to keep workers in a devastated Japanese homeland.
To keep workers in a devastated Japan, to institute these guarantees, there had to
be some organization to the labor that had survived. Unlike the German model, however,
which coalesced around industry-wide unions, Japanese unions are more fully based
around “plant based labor markets”.60 It is these unions, while only representing twenty
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two percent of workers in Japan that set the standard for the other unorganized firms. 61 It
is also these unions that have accepted the real wage drop as described above. Also a
question that remains is what the advantage of such an informal system would be.

In

the chapter examining Germany, the advantages of a formal system were looked at. The
informal system of the Japanese, however, hold many advantages, not the least of which
is using the culture of the Japanese, and indeed of Asia, in building up an economic
model that is an attractive alternative to the model of the United States and even as an
alternative to the non-liberal model of Germany. In other words, the success of the
Japanese model up until the 1990s showed that massive changes not only to the economic
system, but also to a country‟s culture and way of life was not only unnecessary, but
possibly even harmful to the state. The Japanese economic model was a true third way, a
“plan-rational economy, neither socialist nor Anglo-American capitalist in orientation or
operation.”62 Little wonder that states such as South Korea and Taiwan decided to
duplicate it rather than a U.S. style model. In many ways, it can be said that the Japanese
non-liberal capitalism is a perfect fit for Asia and Asian culture.
Furthermore, it is these informal guarantees that make the Japanese model so
difficult to adapt and reform. These guarantees have their genesis in the very culture of
Japan, which itself is not easy to change. Governments can pass laws and courts can set
mandates, and in the West, such as Germany, the culture is centered on the rule of law.
This is not the case in East Asia. It is far easier to change and adapt a written law than
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one that exists merely in the core of a culture, making reform of the Japanese labor
system a difficult task.
Another way these ties are apparent is in the system of shareholding. Examined
in some detail in following chapters, the shareholding system is a good indicator of the
direction of the economic system. In Japan, banks and non-financial firms both hold 25
percent of the publicly available stock. The banks owned a quarter of the publicly listed
countries, to look at it another way.63 Moreover, the banks in Japan –as in Germanyhold loans that constitute the lion‟s share of corporate financial liabilities, from 60 to 70
percent of those liabilities. It is not surprising then that these banks have a steering
function, as in Germany.64
Like Germany, a producer-driven economy was an excellent match for the goals
that Japan wished to achieve when rebuilding the state during the American Occupation.
Also like Germany, the population was not in a position to support a consumer-driven
economy. While there is little surprise that such an economy developed, the question as
to whether or not it is sustainable in the age of a globalized economy remains.
Conclusions
The Japanese capitalist model is perhaps one of the more interesting studies.
Built on culture and tradition rather than rule-of-law, perhaps one of the most interesting
aspects, especially to those who have a Eurocentric mindset is the fact that such a system
could even succeed, even in the “short” term. The success of the Japanese model,
especially in terms of “catching up” cannot be debated, however. What can be debated is
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whether an informal system based on culture and tradition, in unwritten guarantees and
promises can be competitive in the new world. The very nature of this system makes
change very difficult, for the state and the people are being asked not just to change laws,
but to change the very essence of a society that they hold dear to their hearts. In many
ways, this can be seen as a far more difficult task than changing policy in a state such as
Germany.
One can ask though whether it is necessary to change the culture, or if it is
possible to adapt the new global economy to the culture. This culture has much that is
not compatible with the new global economy, making change even more difficult.
Obviously, change has occurred before, or the economic miracle of Japan would not even
be spoken of, much less exported to the Pacific Rim. Further study of how those other
states -South Korea, Taiwan, and of course China- might give some insight into how to
adapt the strengths of Japan‟s capitalist model to the new world economic order.
Economic growth breeds political liberalism, an effect that should be of much interest as
China becomes a stronger player on the world stage.
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Chapter 6
Spoils of Victory: The United States Model

The gold standard of a consumer driven, innovative, market based liberal
capitalist model, the United States has experienced constant growth since the end of the
Second World War, without the prolonged periods of stagnation experienced by Japan
and Germany. This chapter examines the liberal model embraced by the United States,
and how the flexibility granted by a model that is not intrinsically tied with labor and is
funded by a market based system allows for the ability to adapt quickly to changing
international economic norms.
The liberal economic model in the United States developed over the course of two
hundred years and did not have to be rebuilt in the same manner after the end of the war
as Japan and Germany did. The war was actually an economic boon to the United States,
which up until 1941 was still struggling with the effects of the Great Depression. Being a
victorious party of the Second World War, along with being the only major Allied power
that did not suffer any physical damage to the home country put the U.S. in a unique
position at the end of the conflict. The casualty level of over half a million men, though
significant, paled in comparison to the losses sustained by Japan and Germany, or by
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some of the U.S. allies.65 Just as important was that the United States suffered no
damage to its infrastructure. Unlike their defeated German and Japanese counterparts,
U.S. veterans did not return to rubble but rather to a bustling economy and a country
eager to reward their heroes. As a result of post war economic development followed a
highly different track, one that gave the United States the ability to adapt far more
quickly when the economic model changed so drastically following the end of the Cold
War. The liberal capitalist system in the United States, much like the labor system,
differs from the systems in Germany and Japan in several key aspects. Perhaps the most
interesting aspect of these differences is that all skew towards allowing more and quicker
flexibility in the economic system. Three key aspects that differentiate the U.S. capitalist
system from Germany and Japan are the stock market, the role of banks, and the focus of
the liberal economy, namely the consumers.
The United States was not in the same situation as Japan and Germany, a primary
reason that a very different system developed. Labor, while still important- especially in
a manufacturing-based economy that was running at a fever-pitch- did not have the same
footing to call the shots as did the survivors of the defeated Axis powers. Another way
that the United States system developed differently was the capital financing system.
Unlike Japan and Germany which are not only steered but also financed largely by the
central banks, corporations in the United States are financed by investors, often through
the well developed stock market (public ownership). This type of system results in
corporate governance that does not share the patience that is a defining feature of the
non-liberal systems. With close to 90 percent of the voting shares in publicly listed
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corporations owned by pension funds, mutual funds, and individual households,66 it can
be expected that year after year of continual corporate losses will not be tolerated,
especially by those looking at their retirement portfolios and those who make their livings
on stock market trading. These shareholders are also going to be interested in continual
innovation. Attempting to put this another way, shareholders, whether large
organizations or small day traders, understand that in the American economic system,
those who rest on their laurels will quickly be passed by. These shareholders or rather
the shareholders who hold voting stock in a corporation are the ultimate authority. Just
like politicians those in power, i.e. CEOs, wish to stay in power. Upsetting the majority
of voting shareholders, even if the corporation is doing well, is not the best way to keep
one‟s position.
Going further with this case, innovation or research and development is not just
encouraged in this type of system, it is required. The United States economic system is
oriented toward innovation, and it can be argued based around innovation.67 This
emphasis on innovation carries over to both the role of the banks and the consumer basis
of the United States economic system.
In other words, the United States had no need to “catch-up” but rather a need to
innovate. This innovation-based economy required a large amount of flexibility for both
labor and the employers. This plays itself out in a number of ways in the labor system,
such as the low levels of unionization, the mobility of the American worker, the average
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tenure of a worker, and the unique system of reeducation available for the United States
worker.
Unionization in the United States has a long and interesting history. There is no
doubt, however, that unionization has been in decline since the end of the Second World
War with coverage of only fifteen percent by the mid nineteen-nineties.68 While this
does vary from industry to industry and from region to region, the cumulative effect is
that the United States has one of the lowest levels of unionization in the developed world.
The reasons for this are varied, such as governmental interference, management
resistance, free-shop regulations, and a general indifference on the part of U.S. workers,
especially those who were not reared in areas with a strong union presence. Opinion of
labor unions in the United States is actually mixed, with many seeing unions as a
hindrance to economic growth rather than a benefit.69
There is not a cultural attachment to unions in the United States as in Japan and
Germany. Unions fail, according to some literature, due to a lack of their own will and
must share a part of the blame for the decline of the union movement since the end of the
Second World War.70 Accepting the thesis that the genesis of the labor movements in
Japan and Germany came from an entirely different situation than existed in the United
States, one can see the reason for this apathy. There was no emergency situation that
required the labor to coalesce and demand greater control. Indeed, what ended up
happening in the United States, according to Clawson and Clawson, was that unions and
management developed an unofficial accord where “business accepted unions and unions
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became the de facto allies of management, helping to regulate and co-opt worker
discontent”71
Even this accord was not enough to maintain what little true power the unions
had, as management resistance became more and more pronounced. With the rise of
globalization and neo-liberal economic theory, unions became more and more a
roadblock to what the corporations thought was progress. As such, management began to
resist both existing and new union movements, using a variety of methods to discourage
unionization. These methods included passive interference such as delay tactics, to
compulsory company meetings where anti-union presentations were made- without any
equal time provision- all the way to the forced quitting or outright firing of those who
engaged in union activity.72
This resistance was aided by laws and political developments that further eroded
the influence of unions. United States labor has the right to organize, yet at the same
time employers are allowed by law to “influence and intervene in the process,”73 a
situation unique among all industrial democracies.74 Even if a union exists or is formed,
the most powerful weapon -organized work stoppage or striking- is curtailed by law.
Many unions are prohibited by law from striking, usually for reasons of public safety or
order, and in cases where organized work stoppages are allowed, the employers maintain
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the right to continue production and bring in permanent replacement workers.75 Striking
workers would then be reassigned, often into undesirable positions.
In addition to the continued weakening of the power of unions, the political clout
of the unions continues to weaken as well. The rise in power and six-year near absolute
control the anti-union Republican Party enjoyed from 2000-2006 severely curtailed the
influence of labor organizations and the rise of the “moderate” wing of the Democratic
Party has curtailed this influence even further. This is a bitter pill for unions as the
Democratic Party has been the traditional ally of organized labor.76
As with unions, banks in the United States share little of the clout of their
counterparts in Japan and Germany. Banks in the United States fill much different roles
than the banks of Germany and Japan. Not centralized or under the control of the
government save for regulatory functions, such as the FDIC and key interest rates, banks
in the United States do not have a steering function in U.S. corporations. In terms of
bank loans to corporate liabilities, a factor examined with both Germany and Japan, the
ratio is only 25 percent, as opposed to 60-70 percent in Japan.77 Therefore, it can safely
be said that banks are not the major source of capital in the Unites States. They do fulfill
important functions including secondary financing, cash management, selective advisory
work and other finance related services.78 However, the trend is for corporations to rely
on retained earnings or capital markets to fund investments.79
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This is an important distinction that again shows an economic system that relies
on flexibility. The process of attaining bank loans is a cumbersome process, and for
small or even medium businesses can be difficult to gain access to bank loans. The ease
and speed of using one‟s own funds goes without saying, and the process of raising
capital via the market does not require collateral or a lengthy application process. The
trade-off for this is that some control of the corporation is ceded to the shareholders who
are looking for quick results in many cases. It is a rare shareholder who is willing to
invest in an innovation that will not return profits in a reasonable amount of time. In
terms of bank ownership of publicly available stock, the rate in the United States is less
than one percent, as opposed to 10 percent in Germany and 25 percent in Japan.80 It is a
reasonable conclusion then, looking at that figure and the ratio of bank loans to corporate
liability that the U.S. banks are not in the business of capital allocation and as a result not
a large player in steering economic direction.
The United States labor model, like the capitalist model, has several unique
features. In addition to the influence or outright control of organized labor, another
feature of the United States labor system that is unique is the comprehensive system of
reeducation available to experienced workers. This system has its roots as well in the
period following the Second World War.
With thousands of veterans returning, there was a need to prevent the situation
that had existed immediately after the end of the First World War when soldiers returned
to high unemployment. There was also a desire to reward the victorious soldiers, and
some of this reward came in the form of the GI Bill, part of which included a payment
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voucher for college tuition.81 With the large number of returning soldiers spread out
across the country, the existing system of a small number of large four-year universities
made higher education, even with tuition vouchers, inaccessible for many veterans. The
two-year or community college system, already in place, began to expand in great
numbers, doubling in enrollment between 1944 and 1947. Enrollment further increased
after the end of the Korean War, and quadrupled in the nineteen sixties, as the baby
boomers came of age and the Pell grant system came into place. 82
However, it should be noted that the evolving community college system is more
important for U.S. labor. Originally instituted for the expressed purpose of awarding
Associates of Arts degrees, or degrees that allow for the transfer into a university system,
the community college has expanded into vocational training, workforce development,
and continuing or non-degree-seeking programs.83 While the crown jewel is the
Associates of Arts, it is these Associate of Science and Vocational Certificate programs
that pay the bills for many of the country‟s community colleges. These colleges often
gear themselves toward serving the so-called “non-traditional student,” defined as any
student who does not fill the standard definition of a student who has just finished high
school, usually in age from 17-19 and supported by their parents. This definition of the
“traditional student” has become less and less “traditional,” in 1997 close to thirty percent
of students enrolled in higher education are over the age of 30.84 Community colleges
achieve this through a number of methods, including lower tuition, gearing class
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schedules for working students, such as weekend and evening courses, and reaching out
to part-time students.
For American workers that have been laid off or are in an industry that is in
decline, the availability of re-training is a unique “safety- net” available to them, as is the
ability to change careers. Financial aid programs make education at the community
college- with an average annual tuition of $1,283 for full time students85- affordable for
most working adults, particularly those attending part-time. Current research does
indicate that a large number of non-traditional students are taking advantage of the
Federal Pell grant system, to the point that “the median recipient is not a teenager, but a
student in her twenties.”86
A laid off worker, or a worker deciding to “get while the getting is good” would
likely have the following profile: They are over the age of 30, attending school part-time
while holding down a job to pay the bills, pursing a program with the major purpose of
being trained for a specific occupation once the program is completed- in other words, a
nursing degree rather than a political science degree- and is utilizing the financial aid
programs available to them. In some cases, this is their first time in higher education, and
therefore is in need of remedial classes, another specialization of the community colleges.
Other times, they have already secured employment, and their education is being paid by
their new company, with the understanding of a work contract to last several years.
This system is important as it is an indicator of the course that the United States
took with their labor system after the end of the Second World War. The fact that such a
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system is in place, along with the financial aid programs, gives employers the moral
cover they need when they announce downsizing or realignment. It is also an indicator of
greater flexibility in the liberal system.
Despite these peculiarities in the liberal capitalist system of the United States, the
biggest and most important difference is the main player in steering United States
economic policy: the consumer. The United States liberal economic model is a
consumer-based system. What this means is that the consumers, not the producers,
decide what is produced. This is a direct result of the innovation based economy.
In other words, the economic direction of the United States is directed by where
the dollars go. Personal technology is perhaps the greatest example. From VCRs to
cellular phones to MP3 players, items that are at first considered to be novelty quickly
become household mainstays. This is not due to Apple deciding that MP3 players need
to be in the American consumer‟s hands, it was due to consumer demand for a better
portable music system. Another interesting aspect of this is that it is consumers, not
producers, who decide on which model, which design, or which format will be the
industry standard. Take for example the so-called “format war” during the early age of
home video recorders. Two competing and incompatible systems, the VHS and Beta,
were introduced to the market at roughly the same time. Beta was widely considered to
be the superior system in terms of quality, but VHS had the advantage of a longer
recording time. VHS also allowed the licensing of the system, allowing other companies
to market clones of the system, as opposed to Sony, who kept the Beta system
proprietary. The resulting reduction in price and growth in availability of the VHS
system allowed for the inferior product to gain the larger market share, and by the mid to
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late nineteen-eighties, VHS was the industry standard.87 It was the consumers who had
decided this.
Walkmans were replaced by portable CD players, which in turn were replaced by
portable MP3 players. VHS was replaced by DVD, and even now a new format war
rages to replace the DVD. Consumers demand innovations, those who do not innovate
are left to the dust pile of history. To innovate, there must be flexibility, room to grow
and adapt. This is the defining feature of the liberal capitalist system.
Conclusions
The United States has a very different system. The reasons for this are varied and
it can be expected that it should be different from Japan and Germany given the
differential outcomes of the Second World War. However, it is these differences that
make the United States economy much more versatile and able to withstand the shocks
and changes in the worldwide economy. There are some unfortunate side effects to this
liberalism, including corporations‟ flexibility to let go of workers, to move overseas, to
institute programs in other states with very little oversight by the national government. It
can be argued that there is too much flexibility in the United States system, that the
continual need to innovate in order to please the consumers that feed and direct the
economy causes massive abuses in the system, and that these abuses are morally covered
by lower prices for the consumer or by the comprehensive retraining programs offered in
the United States. These too are difficulties and challenges that are not easily remedied.
However, in an objective analysis of the global economic system, it is sure that the
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United States system has been the most successful, especially of the three systems
examined in this paper. In the following chapter, the differences of those three systems
will be compared and contrasted, along with the effects of these differences.
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Chapter 7
Catching Up and Slowing Down: Comparisons and Contrasts of the United States,
Germany and Japan.

Exactly what is the best model, or more appropriately, what are the advantages
the United States model has and are they actually advantages? In the brief overview of
the three systems, differences have emerged in both labor and the capitalist systems.
Major differences in labor systems include: The influence of labor on government, the
influence of government on labor, the formal guarantees that are given to labor by
company management and the government, the informal guarantees granted to workers,
and the ability to retrain or change careers in the middle of employment lifetime. In
terms of the capitalist systems, the differences examined include the role of banks, the
major sources of capital and the central force of the economy. These differences all
restrict or enhance the flexibilities that seem to stimulate economic growth. The major
differences addressed in this paper: Influence of labor on government and the influence
of government on labor, formal and informal guarantees to labor, banks and the capital
markets, producer driven economies vs. consumer driven economies, and finally the
challenges of globalization are each examined with overall conclusions at the end of the
chapter.
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Influence of Labor on Government and the Influence of Government on Labor
Germany and Japan both operate under a simple truth: Those who ignore labor do
so at their own peril. Attempting to reform the economy is always a dangerous game,
especially in democratic regimes that must eventually answer to the people who were
affected by the reforms.
Let‟s look at it another way, from the view of the government. It is an axiom that
those in power wish to stay in power. In democratic regimes, such as the three we are
looking at, staying in power means keeping the populace you must eventually answer to
happy. Ancient Rome utilized to great effect the concept of Bread and Circuses, or in lay
terms: keep the people fed and entertained. This powerful concept is still in place today,
and even the democratic governments utilize it to some degree. While the bread and
circuses are not provided by the state, the means by which the populace buy bread and
attend circuses are very much dependent on what the state can provide: an economy that
will self-generate jobs, but more importantly, jobs that will provide enough compensation
that workers can not only provide for their necessities on a long term basis but also
advance in their careers.
In Japan and Germany, the catch-up models, these goals are achieved by a state
that has instituted a symbiotic relationship with labor. The governments, in other words,
need labor to shore up their power, and vice versa. In contrast, the United States,
particularly since 1994, has adopted what could be described as an adversarial
relationship to labor. What are the effects of this on the flexibility of the economy and its
growth?
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Going back to the idea of ignoring labor at the peril of power, it‟s easily seen how
this can cause the governments of Japan and Germany to be cautious about reform.
Economic reform, especially when changing to a more liberal model, can often be painful
for workers as layoffs, closures, pay cuts often can be the result. However short-term
these effects may be, unless the government in power is remarkably fortunate, an election
cycle is likely to occur during the negative effects of these changes. The result of this
goes without saying: the government responsible for those changes, beneficial or not,
will be at the business end of the voter‟s wrath. Not only that, but the new incoming
government will have learned from its predecessor‟s “mistakes” and quickly move to not
only roll back the so-called reforms but also to strengthen the old system. In societies
such as Germany and Japan, where organized labor is a powerful part of the populace,
attempting such reforms without the support of organized labor can be most dangerous.
Contrasting this with the case of the United States, which, especially since the
1994 Republican takeover of Congress has developed a near adversarial relationship with
organized labor-not unexpected, as unions have always been one of the mainstays of the
Democratic Party‟s base- we see an unexpected result: greater freedom to pursue reforms
that may cause some harm to established labor. Take, for example, the recent attention
that has been paid to the struggling manufacturing sector of the United States economy.
Once a stronghold of union power, the manufacturing sector has weakened with the rise
of globalization and neo-liberal political economy.88 With the dropping of trade barriers,
both formal and informal, companies have been freer to pursue different business models,
including a heavy reliance on foreign factories and the lower-wage foreign workers. The
88
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results of this model are greater profits for the business, supposed lower prices for the
American consumer and the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector. However, the
growth in GDP does indicate that this model increases national GDP. The growth in
GDP for the United States in 1981-1990 averaged 1.9% per year. From 1991 to 2000,
commonly considered to be the advent of globalization, American GDP increased to an
average growth of 3.2%. This growth in GDP is tempered by the loss of jobs in the
American manufacturing sector, evidenced by the growth of the infamous Northeast and
Middle West “rust belt”.
This change in direction, however, would have been difficult for the United States
to pursue had there been more effective resistance by the labor movements. In fact, the
opening up of trade barriers began in earnest by a Democrat, President Bill Clinton. By
instituting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and spearheading the
growth in influence of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (later renamed the
WTO, or World Trade Organization), this member of the traditionally-labor-union
friendly Democratic Party took a leading role in the further weakening of the unions‟
political influence. While there has been a backlash that has grown in strength in recent
years against globalization and the neo-liberal movement, the dropping of trade barriers
is continuing at a fast pace for the United States, evidenced by the passing of the Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2006, fiercely opposed by organized labor.
Formal Guarantees and Informal Guarantees: What do they actually guarantee?
We see above that there is strong evidence that the flexibility enjoyed by the
United States due to the waning influence of organized labor has benefited it, at the very
least in terms of economic growth. Turning now to the unions themselves, the question
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must be asked as to whether or not the guarantees that organized labor gives to its
members (and non-members, as organized labor does seem to set the tone for all other
worker guarantees) help or impede economic growth.
This is a difficult and multi-layered question. It can be argued that any guarantee
given to workers will impede economic growth. Take, for example, the minimum wage.
The argument against this is quite simple: There is a natural limit for which people will
not work for. As companies would be required to pay less, they could hire more
employees willing to work at that price. Theoretically then, unemployment would cease
to exist. While compelling, the hypothesis ignores a number of concerns, including that
there is no guarantee that companies would take those savings and invest in more human
capital, that if workers are earning below subsistence wages, there is no discretionary
funds to go towards the company‟s bottom-line in a consumer-driven economy, and that
at a certain point it is more profitable to just go on welfare and be a ward of the state.
This is brought up because it should be pointed out that guarantees to workers are not
necessarily an impediment to growth, and in fact, could be a benefit. The question,
complex as it is, is at what point the guarantees start to impede growth, and which ones
impede growth faster or more severely, to the point that the costs outweigh the benefits of
these guarantees.
The major guarantees given to Japanese and German employees include lifetime
employment, strong protections in terms of both wages and workplace protection, and
protections against layoff or firing (excepting termination due to negligence or
malfeasance.) Workers in the United States, at least on a system-wide level, do not enjoy
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these benefits. How do these benefits restrict economic flexibility and does this greater
flexibility translate into greater growth?
All these guarantees boil down simply to once you have a job, you will keep that
job. This was a powerful motivator to keep a short supply of labor in place after the end
of the Second World War. This paper has gone back often, because it is important to
understand what it must have been like for those who had survived the war both on the
battlefront and the home front. Everything they had known was destroyed, and worse,
they were the losing party. Nothing was guaranteed. But Japan and Germany needed
them to rebuild, and the economic system that developed had the double advantage of
both catching up and keeping the workforce in place. Now that they have caught up, the
cost is becoming clear. These guarantees do limit the flexibility for companies to adapt
to the changing global economy.
In business, the greatest expense is human capital, particularly in the developed
world. Protections and taxes are a weight on businesses. With each technological
innovation, there is a cost for labor, as these innovations cut down on the need for labor.
As a result, these innovations meet with strong resistance from labor- the infamous case
of the Dutch workers throwing their wooden shoes into the mechanical looms- and
innovation does not necessarily have to come in the form of technology. A contemporary
example, the movement from on-site storage to the Just In Time (JIT) model (ironically
developed by the Japanese) cut down on the need for warehousing and those jobs. The
movement of manufacturing to semi-peripheral nations has had a decimating effect on the
manufacturing sector of developed nations. However, we have shown already the
advantages of these innovations. These innovations come at a high cost to workers
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however, and in the case of Japan and Germany, it makes it difficult at best to institute
these changes. Pressure from the rank-and-file of the unions becomes pressure on the
leadership of the unions, which in turn becomes pressure on elected leaders. This
symbiotic relationship in fact becomes a brake on the ability to adapt economically.
This ability is shown in an interesting and unique way in the United States. In the
preceding chapter, the system of the community colleges was examined in some detail.
How this shows the flexibility of the United States system is an interesting subject. It is
an example that shows an often overlooked aspect of the American economic system.
Workers have the ability to adapt to the changing economy, even at later stages of their
career. This flexibility has two major benefits. First, it gives American workers the
chance to improve their own footing, and second, it gives American companies the moral
cover necessary to engage in activities such as shutting down factories or workshops that
are the economic lifeblood of a community. It can be argued that American companies
take advantage of this moral cover at far too great a rate, regardless; it is still an indicator
of the greater flexibility of the liberal system. It is also, just as the German labor
economic system reflects the German culture and the Japanese labor economic system
reflects the Japanese culture, this unique flexibility reflects the American ideal of taking
control of one‟s destiny, and research shows it does have a positive effect, both in the
education level of American workers as well as their own economic performance.
Banks and the Capital Markets
The banking systems in Japan and Germany have two defining features: They
perform a steering function in the economic system itself, and they are the primary source
of capital in those systems. This allows for two things. First, the producers in these
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economies have the benefit of a system that by its very nature is patient and more mindful
of the long-term implications of capital allocation. They are not subject to the whims of
an investor wanting immediate return or a consumer wanting the newest and greatest
innovation. Given the structured nature of loan payback- over a long period of time with
the money generating interest- immediate return on investment is not a concern.
Second, given the nature of the banks in Germany and Japan, the central
government has some formal and informal control over the direction of the state
economy. To put it simply, the governments perform a steering function over the banks,
and the banks perform a steering function over the economy. This type of system could
not exist in an economy where the capital market is the primary source of capital. When
that happens, economic control devolves to shareholders, and in true liberal capitalist
countries, the banks hold very few shares of public companies.
In the United States, the case study of liberal capitalism, the primary capital
allocation institution is the capital, or stock market. What this means is that public
corporations trade off a portion of their controlling interest for capital. The effect of this
is a system that demands a much faster return time. Individual investors and mutual
funds are not willing to wait twenty years for a return on their investment. In many ways,
this is liberal democracy in an economic form. (After a fashion. Corporate voting is
certainly not one shareholder/one vote.) In order to meet a faster return time and satisfy
capital market demands a free market is required and is the result. Government has little
influence over the allocation of market funds, and has even less influence on the
consumers that drive the economy. To put the point clearly, in the liberal-capitalist
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model, the central government has little direct or indirect control or steering ability of the
market.
Producer Driven vs. Consumer Driven
The distinction of a consumer driven economy versus a producer driven economy
is perhaps the defining feature of the two systems. Germany and Japan are producer
driven economies, the United States consumer driven. This difference, more than any
other, directs the economic direction of the three states, and clearly shows why more
flexibility is necessary in a consumer driven economy.
In order to please the constantly changing, constantly improving, constantly
adapting consumer, innovation has to be quick, affordable, convenient and accessible to
the everyday user. Easier said than done, but as companies such as Commodore and
Atari discovered those who are unwilling to continually innovate will be left behind, and
there is little if any chance of catching up. A consumer driven economy is by definition a
free market, subject to the whims not of a government or central bank, but to the
consumers who feed it and the shareholders who fund it. To put it another way, a
consumer driven economy cannot exist in Germany or Japan today. However, it must be
noted that it would have been impossible to build a functioning and sustainable consumer
driven economy in Japan and Germany after the end of the Second World War. Such an
economy requires a consumer base that is able to afford the goods and services that such
an economy would produce, and after the shock of that conflict, those factors did not
exist in those two states. A producer driven economy was the result.
Still capitalist in nature, with private ownership and decision making a feature, the
producer driven economy is as has so often been stated in this work a third way that
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shuns socialist control yet is not a laissez-faire Anglo-American economy. This
economic model relies on capital from banks rather than a capital market, and on a
government that is steering, though not controlling, economic and monetary policy.
Producers must take direction from somewhere- either from the bottom up as in a
consumer driven economy, or in the top down as in a producer driven economy. While
governments in non-liberal capitalist countries do not own or control the means of
production, they do, through institutions such as the banks, control the direction that the
economy takes. Producers are seen, as stated before, as national assets, much like oil or
natural gas. They are resources for the state to use for the benefit of their international
standing, their economic strength, their wealth and power. This fits in so well with both
Germany and Japan‟s political culture that it would be amazing if such a system had not
developed in those two states.
One can see then the inherent loss of economic flexibility in a producer driven
economy. Producers yield not to the people, or the consumers, but to the steering power
of the state. This can make quick adaptation difficult, especially in states where the
government derives their power from the electorate.
Challenges of Globalization
There is no doubt that for over forty years the non-liberal economic systems of
Japan and Germany were incredibly successful, and showed little or no signs of slowing
down. They were doing so well that in the 1970s and 1980s there was legitimate concern
that the non-liberal capitalist model might well overtake the liberal capitalist model and
this did not go unnoticed by developing states. However, in the nineteen-nineties there
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came two shocks to both systems that began to truly show their weaknesses and brought
an end to both miracles.
First was the actual catching up of both economies. Both systems were built and
developed with one goal: To rapidly rebuild their industrial base and become a global
player on par with the largest economies. This they achieved remarkably well. However,
once caught up, the non-liberal economies were not well suited for innovation or for the
rapid adjustments necessary in an economy that is leading rather than following. This
effect may not have been so hard felt had it not been for the second shock of
globalization.
In the case of Germany, there was also in the nineteen nineties a large movement
towards economic integration in the European Community. This integration began soon
after the Second World War and by the late nineteen nineties had progressed to
integration of several of the major economic currencies in Europe, including the German
mark and French franc. While this economic integration certainly had an impact on the
German economy; those effects are outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on the
non-liberal economic model of Germany and the challenges of that model in the age of
globalization.
When speaking of globalization, it is important to make the distinction that the
globalized economy tends to take on a neo-liberal model. In other words, it is the United
States model taken beyond borders. With the fall of the Soviet Union the major
roadblock to the exporting of the United States system worldwide was dismantled.
Coupled with the “shock therapy” that several of the former Soviet client states
undertook, and the First World‟s dominance of the world economic organizations, the
76

long simmering conflicts of non-liberal and liberal capitalism finally came to a head, with
the non-liberal economies on the losing end. In such a global system that requires lower
costs, faster innovation, and greater overall economic efficiency, the non-liberal systems
are at a distinct disadvantage.
Conclusions
In the comparison and contrasts for this chapter, one can easily see where the
liberal capitalist economic and labor models grant more flexibility for the consumers and
the producers. Taken with the long term economic performance already described in
earlier chapters, it is a reasonable conclusion that greater economic flexibility yields
greater economic growth, particularly in the age of the neo-liberal globalization. One
must be most careful however. Abrupt changes to economic models rarely lead to
positive results, and there are massive flaws in the liberal capitalist model that cannot and
should not be ignored, particularly in regard to labor and the lessening of the spending
power of consumers.
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Chapter 8
Greater Flexibility, Greater Growth: An Accurate Assumption?

While it does seem from the evidence presented in these case studies that greater
economic flexibility leads to greater economic growth, one must be careful not to go too
far with the conclusions that this paper has drawn. At first glance, this paper may seem
to be an attack on labor unions, labor guarantees and governmental influence of
economies. Such is not the purpose of this paper. The case studies do seem to indicate
that the less influence and fewer guarantees labor and producers have from the central
government, the greater the ability for the economic system to adapt to changing
conditions, leading to better economic performance. However, this paper also highlights
how such influence and guarantees were not only necessary, but natural considering the
massive shock that Japan and Germany had endured at the end of the Second World War.
The United States system, however, also endured some shocks after the end of
that conflict. The community college system truly began to come into its own with the
massive number of returning veterans who had been promised an education once they
were mustered out of service. It must be understood how important the community
college system, coupled with the federal student aid system, is to the thesis of this paper.
Greater flexibility must be available at all levels, from the systemic level to the
individual, and there must be both an accessible higher education system and a financial
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aid system available to students at any age and any level for the individual system to be
viable. While it should not be sugar-coated the difficulty in changing careers at mid-age:
the returning student is often saddled with a mortgage, a young family, miscellaneous
debts, along with the difficulty in returning to, or possibly even attending for the first
time, the rigorous demands of the post-secondary system, even attending part time. Yet it
is a unique feature of a uniquely liberal American labor system.
There does remain a question as to whether or not the extended downturn in Japan
and Germany are the result of faults in the non-liberal economic system or the result of
normal, long-term cyclical changes in the global economic system. Is it possible that, all
things being equal, Germany and Japan will start to experience a natural turnaround while
the Unite States starts to falter? Indeed, as of 2007 there is some evidence of this,
particularly with the continuing weakening of the dollar vs. the Euro and the Japanese
Yen. However, it must also be noted that empirical evidence does not show that the
economies of Japan and Germany are improving, despite the economic power of a rising
Asia and a confederated Europe. Germany and Japan since the 1990s on have
experienced continual malaise after over forty years of phenomenal growth. While it is
possible that Germany and Japan are experiencing an economic “correction” cyclical
downturn, this cycle would be far longer than the time examined in this paper.
What developed in Japan and Germany in the time covered in this paper was a
marvel not only because of the impressive results for almost forty years, but also because
of how perfectly the system came together in those two states. It is little surprise that this
third way of producer driven economies became such an attractive model to other
developing countries and economies. The situation that existed in Germany and Japan in
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1945, however, was so unique that true duplication is impossible without the complete
destruction of another world conflict, a conflict that most in the world are quite keen on
avoiding. It may well be impossible to truly export the German and Japanese producer
driven models, as the infrastructure and even the political systems developed in tandem
with those economies. It is this fact that makes the flaws in those systems all the more
difficult to rectify. At any time that guarantees are given, or agreed upon, it must be
understood that an opportunity cost of such an agreement is the limiting of the ability to
adapt. Agreements often become archaic and a burden to at least one of the sides very
soon after they are signed. In Japan and Germany, however, there are unique challenges
that have to be met if the continued malaise is to be broken. What is difficult, indeed,
what makes it such a challenge, is that these guarantees are so intertwined with the
Japanese and German political cultures, that changes to these systems is difficult are the
traditional sense that such changes would almost certainly cause short term (a relative
terminology, to be sure) hardship for the very group they are trying to help. It is also
difficult in that a politician is asking their people, their culture, to go against the values
and traditions that have existed in some case for centuries. To make an impossible sell
even more impossible, these politicians and leaders are asking their people to adopt a
system from a state that is viewed by some in pure contempt.
However, such changes are necessary. The purpose of this paper was to examine
the unique aspects of each of these capitalist economies, and determine whether the
continued growth of the United States had at least a major “root” in the economic
systems differences. We have seen the differences and how they could restrict the ability
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for economies to adapt and grow. While the actual, specific changes that should be made
are outside the scope of this work, further research is warranted.
Balance is necessary in all things. Greater flexibility does lead to greater growth.
What must be guarded against, however, is the temptation to free the economy too
quickly. Greater flexibility, done too quickly, will not lead to greater growth, but rather
to the dreaded “race to the bottom”. That has been the lesson for the United States in the
last decade.
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